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Utopia Reconsidered: The Modern Firm as 
Institutional Ideal1 
John Dobson 
This paper challenges Alasdair MacIntyre's assertion that the modern firm - such as Google, Unilever, or 
Microsoft - is inimical to human flourishing within an Aristotelian framework. The paper begins by 
questioning MacIntyre's rendering ofutopian communities. It then addresses four specific criticisms ofthe 
modern firm to be found throughout MacIntyre's oeuvre, namely compartmentalisation, myopia, 
inequality, and loss ofcommunity. Arguments are made to the effect that these criticisms do not vitiate the 
institutional role ofthe modern firm in an Aristotelian context. The paper concludes with an invocation 
ofthe modern firm as institutional ideal within an evolving utopian vision ofhuman flourishing. This is 
a utopian vision in which the modern firm plays a constructive, not corruptive, institutional role. 
Introduction 
In the introductory article to this special issue of Philosophy ofManagement, Alasdair MacIntyre 
reintroduces us to the plight of traditional New England fishing communities. His is a tale of a 
fallen Eden: a tradition of the virtues built up over generations rapidly destroyed by capitalist 
modernity. Indeed throughout his oeuvre MacIntyre has conjured a broad array of these Edens: 
Fishing communities, Welsh mining communities, farming coops in Donegal, Mayan towns in 
Guatemala and Mexico, ancient Greek city states, Greek highland villages, medieval Christian and 
Arab kingdoms, Scottish highland clans before 1600, the Sioux nation, Bedouin of the Western 
desert, and the Irish of the Blasket Islands.2 MacIntyre does not claim that every aspect of these 
societies was admirable. But what he does claim is that each possessed utopian attributes; that is to 
say attributes conducive to the cultivation of virtue-nurturing practices; where a practice is 'any 
coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity'3. In the case of 
Welsh mining communities, for example, he admires 'a way oflife informed by the ethics ofwork at 
the coal face, by a passion for the goods of choral singing and of rugby football and by the virtues of 
trade union struggle against first coal-owners and then the state'4. 
When a MacIntyrean practice functions well, participants therein pursue internal goods of 
excellence by cultivating cardinal virtues of character such as wisdom, justice, integrity, and 
constancy; and by nurturing virtues of acknowledged dependence, such as just generosity, that bind 
the community. In addition, the key to healthy practices is to have them supported materially by 
institutions that, while supplying the external goods of material support, do not interfere with the 
practice's pursuit of the internal goods of excellence. 
Thus MacIntyre argues that, from the study of the above communities, we can learn how to build 
institutions that nurture healthy practices. But why can we not learn this from our own institutions 
of capitalist modernity? We cannot, according to MacIntyre, because the institutions of modernity­
such as the for-profit corporation (referred to hereafter as the 'modern firm') - corrupt practices. 
They do this in two ways. First, modern firms privilege the pursuit of external goods such as wealth 
and status while recognizing internal goods (i.e., goods derived from exercising the virtues within 
practices) only to the extent that the latter serve the attainment of the former. Second, modern firms 
do not just do this accidentally: modernism has rendered the agents of modernity - in the current 
11 wish to acknowledge the administrative assistance of Cassandra Depew, and the helpful comments on 
earlier drafts of this paper from other participants in this special issue 
2 Alasdair MacIntyre 'Utilitarianism and Cost-Benefit Analysis: an essay on the relevance of moral philosophy 
to bureaucratic theoty' in Kenneth Sayte (ed.) Values in the Electric Power Industry Notre Dame University of 
Notre Dame Press 1977; Dependent Rational Animals Illinois Open Court Publishing 1999; 'Corporate 
Modernity and Moral Judgment: are they mutually exclusive?' in Kenneth E. Goodpaster and Kenneth Sayre 
(Eds.) Ethics and Problems ofthe 21" Century Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1979 
3 Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue 2nd Ed Notre Dame: University ofNotre Dame Press 1985 p 187 
4 MacIntyre Alasdair 1999a Dependent Rational Animals l1linois: Open Court Publishing p 143 
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context corporate managers - incapable of exercising sound moral judgment. Thus, as MacIntyre 
states in his introductory article to this special issue: 'The practice of the virtues, conceived as 
Aristotle and Aquinas conceived them, is something difficult to reconcile with functioning well in 
the present economic order... '. 
Some authors attempt to reconcile MacIntyre with modernity by adopting a 'MacIntyre-lite' 
approach in which they separate MacIntyre's institution-practice-virtue construct from his broader 
critique of capitalist modernity. They then attempt to usefully apply the former to the modern firm 
while ignoring the latter; arguing that the modern firm either is, or could be made to be, an 
institution conducive to practices. The problem with this approach is that it inevitably bumps up 
against MacIntyre's macro-critique of capitalism, leading authors of this genre to advocate some 
form of semi-modern firm: a non-profit firm, or a Christian firm, or a feminine firm5• Not 
surprisingly, given his views on capitalism, MacIntyre rejects this approach outright6• 
So to defend the modern firm as it actually exists today in the form of say Microsoft, Unilever, or 
Google requires tackling MacIntyre head-on: tackling both his micro-critique of the modern firm, 
and his macro-critique of capitalism. This paper takes up that challenge. Although the primary 
focus here is the modern firm, rather than capitalism, the two are of course inseparable: the modern 
firm exists entirely within the capitalist embrace, and could exist nowhere else. So any defence of the 
modern firm is by default a defence of capitalism. 
The central argument here is that MacIntyre is too critical of capitalism in general and of the 
modern firm in particular. He fails to recognise the extent to which the modern firm is able to 
provide non-corruptive institutional support for activities that can be reasonably defined as 
practices. As Crockett concludes from his behavioural study of modern managers, included in this 
special issue: 'MacIntyre's theoretical construct, thus interpreted (and despite his pessimism), can be 
empirically identified in modern commercial endeavors'. Indeed the continuing interest in 
MacIntyre's work among management and business scholars bears witness to the power of his 
conceptualisation. MacIntyre provides an invaluable prism through which human organisation can 
be arrayed in terms of internal goods, external goods, virtues, practices, and institutions. The papers 
contained in this special issue - and the many other papers referenced therein - reflect the power of 
MacIntyre's construct. 
Unfortunately, however, through his limited discussion of contemporary business and his atavistic 
renditions of utopian farming and fishing communities and the like, MacIntyre tends to portray a 
caricature of the modern firm. Perhaps due to his experiences in the electrical power industry, 
discussed below, MacIntyre dwells heavily on the bureaucratic nature of the modern manager. He 
gives little weight to the dynamism and idealism that characterise many modern firms and the 
managers therein (as for example discussed by Keat, and discovered empirically by Crockett, in this 
special issue). Of course such things as internal goods and human flourishing are notoriously 
difficult to pin down empirically, but what I hope to show below is that at least some of MacIntyre's 
concerns surrounding the modern firm - vis-a.-vis its ability to provide institutional support for 
practices - can be allayed. 
In the next section I address four basic concerns about the modern firm that appear regularly in 
MacIntyre's writings: compartmentalisation, myopia, inequality, and loss-of-community. I present 
evidence to the effect that, although these are undoubtedly justified concerns, they are nuanced and 
need not necessarily serve to indict the modern firm. In the final section I argue that, even within 
the virtue-practice-institution framework, the modern firm is an institutional form capable of 
supporting a valid utopian ideal. 
5 Geoff Moore and Ron Beadle 'In Search ofOrganizational Virtue in Business' Organization Studies 27 no 3 
2006 P 369-389 and Dobson John 1996 'The Feminist Firm: A comment' Business Ethics Quarterly 6 no 2 p 
227-232 
6 Alasdair MacIntyre op cit 1999 P 145 
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MacIntyre's Critique of the Modem Firm 
Compartmentalisation 
MacIntyre opens his introductory article to this special issue by revisiting one of his long-standing 
concerns surrounding the modern firm, namely compartmentalisation7• The actors within modern 
firms, namely managers, are unable to act as true moral agents. In their actions as managers they 
compartmentalise themselves within the confines of a morally stunted version of utilitarianism, 
namely cost-benefit analysis. The milieu of the modern firm renders them blind to considerations 
beyond the financial 'bottom line'. Managers become Albert-Speer like technicians, diligently 
managing train timetables to ensure the 'efficient' delivery ofJews to concentration camps8. 
For example, in Social Structures and their Threats to Moral Agency, MacIntyre discusses 'a business 
corporation whose chief executive officer decides to exaggerate the progress made by the 
corporation's scientists on a research project, with the aims both of not losing customers to rivals 
and of bolstering share prices'9. MacIntyre argues that the 'only grounds on which objection to such 
deception can be based, if it is to be heard, is that in the longer run deception will fail to maximize 
corporate profits'lo. Some twenty-two years earlier, in Utilitarianism and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
MacIntyre similarly observes that 'once the executive is at work the aims of the public or private 
corporation must be taken as given. Within the boundaries imposed by corporate goals and legal 
constraints the executive's own tasks characteristically appear to him as merely technical'll. And he 
concludes the article by stating that the 'moral considerations underlying cost-benefit analysis are 
simply suppressed'll. In Corporate Modernity and Moral judgment, MacIntyre appears to stray from 
this theme of the manager-as-pure-technician when he opines that 'the modern corporation presents 
itself as a moral being; it is because of this that businessmen are as sensitive as they are to moral 
criticism'13. But he ,returns unambiguously to the former theme later in the same article when 
noting: 'In his capacity of corporate executive, the manager not only has no need to take account of, 
but must not take account of certain types of considerations which he might feel obliged to 
recognize were he acting as parent, as consumer, or as citizen'14. Similarly, in After Virtue, in listing 
managers - along with therapists and aesthetes - as one of the principle 'characters' that define 
modernity, MacIntyre argues that managers 'conceive of themselves as morally neutral characters 
whose skills enable them to devise the most efficient means of achieving whatever end is proposed. 
Whether a given manager is effective or not is on the dominant view a quite different question from 
that of the morality of the ends which his effectiveness serves or fails to serve'IS. And finally, in Why 
are the Problems of Business Ethics Insoluble?, MacIntyre returns solidly to the theme of 
compartmentalisation: 'With one part of the self one is a corporate executive understanding every 
project in terms of a suitably narrow conception of cost-benefit analysis and ignoring large side 
effects of one's activity... Effectiveness in organizations is often both the product and the producer 
of an intense focus on a narrow range of specialized tasks which has as its counterpart a blindness to 
other aspects of one's activity'16. 
7 Alasdair MacIntyre 'Social Structures and their Threat to Moral Agency' Philosophy 74 no 289 July 1999 pp 
311- 329 
8 Ibid and Geoff Moore 'Re-imagining the morality of management: a modern virtue-ethics approach' 
Proceedings of Alasdair MacIntyre's Revolutionary Aristotelianism 29'h June to 1" July 2007; see also Ian 
Mangham 'MacIntyre and the Manager' Organization 2 no 2 1995 pp 181-204 Stanley Deetz 'Character, 
corporate responsibility and the dialogue in the postmodern context' Organization 2 no 2 1995 pp 217-225 
Laura Nash 1995 'Whose Character? A response to Mangham' Organization 2 no 2 1995 pp 226-232 and 
George Randels 'Morality and the Manager after MacIntyre' Organization 2 no 2 1995 pp 205-211 
9Alasdair MacIntyre 'Social Structures and their Threat to Moral Agency' (op.cit) p 322 
10 Ibid P 323 
11 Alasdair MacIntyre 'Utilitarianism and Cost-Benefit Analysis: an essay on the relevance of moral 
philosophy to bureaucratic theory' (op.cit) p 218 
12 Ibid P 237 
13 Alasdair MacIntyre 'Corporate Modernity and Moral Judgment: are they mutually exclusive?' (op.cit) p 
124 
14 Ibid P 126 
15 Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue (op.cit) p 74 
16 MacIntyre Alasdair 'Why are the Problems of Business Ethics Insoluble' in Bernard Baumrin and Benjamin 
Friedman (Eds.) Moral Responsibility and the Professions New York: Haven Publishing 1982 p 357-358 
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Is MacIntyre correct? Does the modern firm induce moral compartmentalisation? Do the managers 
of modern firms frame every decision in terms of a narrowly defined cost-benefit analysis? Do they 
leave their humanity and morality at the door when they enter the boardroom? 
It is certainly true that project evaluation criteria such as net present value or economic value added 
are quantitative techniques that weigh economic costs against economic benefits. But even 
corporate finance texts, which educate future managers in the use of these techniques, explicitly 
discuss their limitations. For example Brigham and Houston, in Fundamentals of Financial 
Management, clearly state that 'decisions must be made using a combination of judgment and 
numerical analysis'17. Of course, as Lee Salter helpfully pointed out in his comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper, what textbooks advocate and what students end up actually doing can diverge 
significantly. But at least the textbooks - even the 'hardcore' finance textbooks - acknowledge a 
world beyond the narrow confines of cost-benefit analysis. Indeed any qualified manager realises, or 
at least should realise, that these quantitative tools are heuristic methodologies based on a host of 
value judgments: not just economic-value judgments concerning the estimation of relevant cash 
flows and interest rates, but also moral-value judgments informed by the personal values of the 
individual manager, the collective cultural values of the practice in which the manager is involved 
(these may be stated explicitly if the practice is say auditing or financial advising), and the values of 
the corporate institution itself (these may also be stated explicitly in a mission statement of 
corporate credo). Of course the material temptations in business are great, as witnessed by the 
ongoing litany of corporate 'scandals'. But at least the institutions surrounding the modern firm, 
and the modern firm itself, bring these transgressions to light and recognize them as such. 
The active role of moral agency in the modern firm is further evidenced by the now vast and ever 
expanding business-ethics literature, replete with articles by practising managers agonising over the 
moral quandaries inherent in their managerial roles. This is further evidenced by the many ongoing 
ethics lecture-series held at many business schools in which managers typically discuss their on-the­
job moral deliberations: for example, the Raytheon ethics lecture-series at Bentley College, 
Massachusetts, and the Markkula series at Santa Clara University, California. These belie 
Macintyre's claim that 'there is no milieu available to them [managers] in which they are able, 
together with others, to step back from those roles and those requirements and to scrutinize 
themselves and the structure of their society from some external standpoint with any practical 
effect'18. Indeed - as Ron Beadle suggests in his comments on an earlier draft of this paper - within 
the virtue-practice-institution construct, this ongoing managerial self-reflection can be viewed as 
the pursuit of internal goods within the practice of maintaining the integrity of the institution.19 
Even observers who reside firmly within a modernist perspective on business recognise goods 
beyond those valued in a conventionally defined cost-benefit analysis. For example, in his broadly 
acclaimed20 book, The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Performance and Growth, John 
Roberts begins with the statement: 'The most fundamental responsibilities of general managers are 
setting strategy and designing the organization to implement it'21. He goes on to state that 'Firms 
are institutions created to serve human needs .. to provide meaningful experiences'22. He recognises 
that this cannot be achieved by applying only explicit criteria (such as cost-benefit analysis), 
evaluative criteria such as corporate culture are equally important: 'Culture is the 'softer' stuff, but it 
is not less important for that. It involves the fundamental shared values of the people in the firm, as 
well as their shared beliefs about why the firm exists, about what they are collectively and 
individually doing, and to what end'23. Note well that Roberts observes managers not taking ends as 
given. Indeed the observations made by Roberts of actual managerial activity are strikingly similar 
to those of Crockett in this special issue. In commenting on managers' responses to his questions, 
17 Eugene F Brigham, Joel F Houston Fundamentals of Financial Management Mason OH: South-Western 
2007 p 448 
18 Alasdair MacIntyre 'Social Structures and their Threat to Moral Agency' (op.cit) p 322 
19 Geoff Mooore and Ron Beadle 'In Search of Organizational Virtue in Business: Agents, Goods, Practices, 
Institutions and Environments' (op.cit) 
20 John Robert's book was selected as 'Business Book of the Year, 2004' by the Economist magazine 
21 John Roberts The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Performance and Growth Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2004 p ix 
22 Ibid P 18 
23 Ibid 
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Crockett concludes that 'the questions were understood in a way approximating Aristotelian 
notions'. In other words, managers were not blind to a MacIntyrean-type perspective on their 
activities. Indeed, in generally placing excellence above success they appear to agree, at least in crude 
terms, with a MacIntyrean hierarchy of goods. To quote Crockett again: 'Interestingly, most 
[managers] asserted that the organization would be more likely to achieve success by focusing on 
excellence than the opposite [i.e., material rewards]'. These descriptions are strikingly similar to 
MacIntyre's prescription that the 'aim internal to such productive crafts, when they are in good 
order, is never only to catch fish, or to produce beef or milk, or to build houses. It is to do so in a 
manner consonant with the excellences of the craft, so that not only is there a good product, but the 
craftsperson is perfected through and in her or his activity'24. As Roberts concludes: 'solving the 
problems of strategy and organization is an act of real creativity'25. 
As with Roberts, leading financial-economist Michael Jensen does not characteristically view 
business through a MacIntyrean prism. But, on the few occasions when Jensen does venture into a 
broad discussion of the nature and purpose of business, we again find descriptions amenable to a 
virtues-practices-institutions schema: 'Value maximization is not a vision or a strategy or even a 
purpose; .. people .. must be turned on by the vision or the strategy in the sense that it taps into 
some human desire or passion of their own - for example, a desire to build the world's best 
automobile or to create a film or play that will move people for centuries'26. So here we see Jensen, 
albeit inadvertently, making a distinction that can readily be seen as analogous to that of internal 
and external goods; and note well that for Jensen the internal goods are the motivator and the 
external goods the way of 'keeping score'. He continues: 
Value seeking tells an organization and its participants how their success in achieving a vision or in 
implementing a strategy will be assessed. But value maximizing or value seeking says nothing about 
how to create a superiot vision or strategy. Nor does it tell employees or managers how to find or 
establish initiatives or ventures that create value... Defining what it means to score a goal in football 
or soccer, for example, tells the players nothing about how to win the game.27 
Jensen's soccer example invites parallels to MacIntyre's discussion of the internal goods of chess: 
'those goods specific to chess, in the achievement of a certain highly particular kind of analytical 
skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity'28. So, in summary, far from leaving their 
moral agency at the door when entering the boardroom, moral agency lies at the heart of managerial 
decision-making in the modern firm. 
Myopia 
This introduces another of MacIntyre's major concerns with the modern firm, namely that of 
myopia: 'The failure to be responsible for the future is not just a product of the negligence of 
individuals, but is rooted in the forms and tendencies of organizational and corporate life'29. He' 
connects this to the narrow focus on cost-benefit analysis, which he believes forces managers to set 
arbitrary, and likely short-term, horizons; 'in a private profit-seeking corporation the current rates 
of return expected on investment will place constraints on such a choice of dates .. '30 This becomes 
manifest in Macintyre's two fishing crews, to be discussed in more detail below: the first modern­
firm-like crew is given the appearance of a much more myopic and nomadic operation than the 
traditional crew. 
24 Alasdair MacIntyre 'A Partial Response to my Critics' in John Horton and Susan Mendus (Eds.) After 
MacIntyre: critical perspectives on the work ofAlasdair MacIntyre Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 
2004 p 284 
25 John Roberts 'The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Performance and Growth Oxford' (op.cit) p 
286 
26 Michael Jensen 'Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function' Social 
Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection 2001 p 16 
27 Ibid 
28 Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue (op.cit) p 187 
29 Alasdair MacIntyre 'Why are the Problems of Business Ethics Insoluble' (op.cit) p 357 
30 Alasdair MacIntyre 'Utilitarianism and Cost-Benefit Analysis: an essay on the relevance of moral 
philosophy to bureaucratic theory' (op.cit) p 232 
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Keat, in this special issue, discusses MacIntyre's fishing crews at length. Keat concludes, however, 
that myopia is a characteristic of certain types of modern firm operating in certain milieus - namely 
liberal as opposed to coordinated market economies - rather than as a necessary characteristic of 
modern firms as such. But, as Jensen points out, even the 'liberal' modern firm recognises the need 
for long-term goals: 'we must give employees and managers a structure that will help them resist the 
temptation to maximize short-term financial performance .. short-term profit maximization at the 
expense of long-term value creation is a sure way to destroy value'3l. Indeed, in Capitalism at the 
Crossroads, Hart observes similarly that 'the firm must not only perform efficiently in today's 
businesses, but it should also be constantly mindful of generating the products and services of the 
future'32. 
In the broader context of MacIntyre's utopian communities, some archeological evidence indicates 
that - at least in the context of natural resource depletion - pre-modern communities were the real 
sufferers from myopia: 'American Indians often so pressured or depleted basic resources like land 
and trees that they had to switch from one type of food to another or move the locations of their 
villages'33; similarly; the indigenous pre-modern culture of Easter Island collapsed when all the trees 
on the island were 'myopically' felled34. 
Inequality 
Another way in which the modern firm frustrates human flourishing, according to MacIntyre, is its 
effect on wealth distribution. In Why are the Problems ofBusiness Ethics Insoluble?, MacIntyre claims 
that 'the larger the piece of the cake taken by one group or individual, the smaller will be the pieces 
left for everyone else'35. This logic rests on the cake itself not growing significantly. But in their 
recent book Good Capitalism Bad Capitalism, Baumol et al. point out that while world population 
grew by 1.6 billion people from 1978 to 2000, the number of people with incomes below $1 per 
day declined by more than 300 million36. Of course this gets into issues ofwelfare versus wealth, but 
suffice to say here that MacIntyre's anti-modem-firm claims surrounding poverty are debatable 
empirically. 
MacIntyre's main concern, however, appears to be not so much the absolute levels of wealth but 
rather how that wealth is distributed. For example, in his introductory article to this special issue, he 
recounts how the wealth available through modern corporate fishing technologies tends to foster 
greed and corrupt communal ties. Similarly, in Dependent &tional Animals, he asserts that 'gross 
inequality of income or wealth is by itself always liable to generate conflicts of interest and to 
obscure the possibility of understanding one's social relationships in terms of a common good'3? 
This prompts two basic questions. First, to what extent are undesirably-broad levels of income 
inequality a necessary feature of the modern firm? Second, more fundamentally, what level of 
aggregate income inequality is actually detrimental to human flourishing? 
These are clearly complex questions, and detailed answers would require a major digression from 
my central argument here. However I would like to note in passing that MacIntyre's views represent 
an extreme on a spectrum upon which there are many arguments; both economic and moral. For 
example, in a recent review of the literature in the evils-of-income-inequality debate, Brittan opines: 
'Equality of income or wealth is neither attainable nor desirable'38. Indeed, there is even no 
31 Michael Jensen 'Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function (op cit) 
32 Stuart Hart Capitalism at the Crossroads New Jersey: Wharton School Publishing 2007 p 63-64 
33 Shepard Krech III 1999 The Ecological Indian New York: Norton Paperbacks 1999 p 76 
34 Ibid 
35 Alasdair MacIntyre 'Why are the Problems of Business Ethics Insoluble' (op.cit) p 352 
36 William J Baumaol, Robert E. Litan and Carl J. Schramm Good Capitalism Bad Capitalism New Haven: 
Yale University Press 2007 p 21 
3? Alasdair MacIntyre Dependent Rational Animals (op.cit)p 144 
38 Brittan Samuel 'Summon the Ghost of Lloyd George' Financial Times Friday July 202007 P 9 
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consensus on the much-publicised 'evils' of executive compensation39. Also, an implication of Keat's 
paper in this special issue is that different manifestations of the modern firm can imply broadly 
different levels of income inequality. As Roberts notes of Nokia in the 1990s: 'People were simply 
expected to do their best .. a top executive described Nokia's people as 'happily badly paid' ..'40. 
Loss ofCommunity 
Another long-standing concern of MacIntyre's is the extent to which market-based relationships 
such as those within and between modern firms 'undermine and corrupt communal ties'41. In 
Corporate Modernity and Moral Judgment: Are They Mutually Exclusive?, MacIntyre lists 'four ways 
the moral structure of the modern corporate world can be defined by negation - by the striking 
absence of honour, of blasphemy, of ceremonial death, and of the story-telling elders'42. Corporate 
modernity, according to MacIntyre, lacks a sense of 'cosmic order'43 in which communal narrative, 
communal recognition of birth and death, communal belief in the divine, and a communal sense of 
honour and insult can all play significant roles. 
MacIntyre's concerns prompt two basic questions: First, rather than destroying community, to what 
extent is the modern firm simply redefining community? Second, is the destruction of community­
at least certain types of community - necessarily a bad thing? 
Rather than simply destroying community as such, there is evidence that the modern firm is simply 
creating different types of community: more fluid, more all-embracing, more virtual, and no less 
virtuous. For example, in Global Microstructures: The Virtual Societies ofFinancial Markets, Cetina 
and Bruegger find evidence of the emergence of 'virtual' communities among foreign exchange 
traders: ' ..social forms are bound together by electronic information technologies .. drawn together 
as if they were in one place'44. In their extensive empirical study the authors find foreign-exchange 
traders - typically characterised as the most red-in-tooth-and-claw-type of financial agents ­
developing their own social norms, their own conceptions of excellence within the practice of 
foreign-exchange trading (although the authors do not use this MacIntyrean terminology), and even 
their own language. Similarly, just casual observation of some modern firms - Microsoft, eBay, 
Google, and Apple, for example - indicate that, far from destroying communal ties, the modern 
firm is continually developing new communities. Indeed, most recently, the rapid growth of social­
networking through internet sites such as YouTube, MySpace, and Facebook is all about building 
communities. Furthermore, these new communities are far more dynamic, all-embracing and 
geographically diverse than their antecedents. 
I turn now to the second question, regarding the desirability of community per se. Jacques Derrida, 
in deconstructing the concept of 'community', notes that the origin of the word is 'common 
munitions', and that communities were traditionally about insularity and forced exclusion45 • The 
basic thrust of Derrida's argument is that the common contemporary bemoaning of a 'loss of 
community' needs careful scrutiny: such a 'loss' is more a 'realignment' of power structures. For 
example, as Frazer and Lacey note in their critique of McIntyre's concept of community and 
39 See for example: Candice Prendergast 'The Provision of Incentives in Firms' Journal ofEconomic Literature 
XXXVII, March 1999 pp 7-63, Jeffrey Moriarty 'Do CEOs Ger Paid Too Much' Business Ethics Quarterly 15 
no 2 April 2005 pp 257-282, John Dobson The Economics and Morality ofExecutive Compensation 2007 
(unpublished working paper) 
40 John Roberts The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Performance and Growth' (op.cit) p 174 Also 
anecdotally, Apple Computer's CEO Steve Jobs' salary is currently $1 per annum; of course he also owns 
many shares and stock-options in Apple, but then so do JUSt about all of Apple's employees. Thus the 
currently high value of these claims - which is generally regarded as a direct result of Jobs' stewardship of 
Apple over the past decade - is a 'good' shared by all employees and many other stakeholdets of this vety­
modern firm. 
41 Alasdair MacIntyre Dependent Rational Animals (op.cit) p 117 
42 Alasdair MacIntyre 'Corporate Modernity and Moral Judgment: are they mutually exclusive?' (op.cit) p 134 
43 Ibid P 133 
44 Karin Knorr Cetina and Urs Bruegger 'Global Microstructure: The Virtual Societies of Financial Markets' 
American Journal ofSociology 107 no 4 Oanuary 2002) p 909 
45 Jacques Derrida. Deconstruction in a nutshell. New York: Fordham University Press 1997, pI 08 
Philosophy of Management Volume 7 Number 1 2008 73 
-----------------.
John Dobson 
practice: 'Feminist theory understands male power exercised and maintained in and throughpractices' .46 Indeed MacIntyre himself recognises, in Dependent RationalAnimals, that communities
'are always open to corruption by narrowness, by complacency, by prejudice against outsiders andby a whole range of other deformities, including those that arise from a cult oflocal community'47.The empirical question arises, therefore, as to whether there is less 'narrowness, complacency, andprejudice' in the communities of the modern firm than is to be found in those 'utopian'communities listed at the beginning of this article. 
Conclusion: Utopia Reconsidered 
One attribute that my and Keat's contributions to this special issue have in common is an early
reference to fishing. I begin with reference to MacIntyre's description of the actual demise oftraditional New England fishing communities; Keat begins with MacIntyre's famous hypotheticalfishing crew comparison48 . This all brings to mind Alfred, Lord Tennyson's famous narrative poem,Enoch Arden. In the poem, Arden is born into a traditional eighteenth century fishing community,
so he grows up a fisherman. But the material hardships of his life drive a utopian vision; but note
well that this is not a vision of a life piously devoted to excellence in fishing, but rather a life ofadventure and material gain: becoming boatswain on a trading ship to China and 'returning rich'49.Note also that Tennyson does not treat Arden's utopian vision as anything unusual or deserving ofmoral opprobrium. Given the severe hardships and uncertainties of the fishermen's and theirfamilies' lives, as described by Tennyson, a desire for material gain is quite understandable. 
A MacIntyrean observer might argue that, by encroaching on the fishing community, the growingcommercial trade with China was threatening the community; destroying a utopia. But clearly
neither Arden nor Tennyson viewed it that way. In essence, the nascent commercial activity - an
early 'modern firm' in the form of a trading ship - empowered Arden; gave Arden a choice. Thetrading ship did not awaken in Arden a desire for external goods. Arden already had that desire; hehad a growing family and a sickly child to support. The opportunity to be boatswain on the trading
ship merely offered him a means to acquire external goods. Did this opportunity represent the
corruption of a practice; the shattering of a utopia? Surely not: life was hard for Arden, but it washarder and even more role-limiting for his wife Annie (and no doubt would have been harder stillfor any person of colour who might have ventured into this community). 
But MacIntyreans would counter that, although Arden's situation was characterised by materialhardships, it did nonetheless possess many characteristics of a utopia; characteristics that would belost with encroaching commercial enterprise. For example, in Dependent Rational Animals,MacIntyre argues that utopia would be 'inimical to and in conflict with the goals of a consumer
society'50. But what I hope the arguments above have demonstrated is that the modern firm and
some valid utopian vision are far from inimical. By this I do not mean to imply that MacIntyre's
concerns surrounding compartmentalisation, myopia, inequality, and loss-of-community have nomerit. These no doubt are concerns that have the potential to thwart human flourishing, and indeed
the business ethics literature is replete with many other concerns surrounding the modern firm. The
evidence briefly summarised here suggests, however, that these concerns might best be addressed ­
and indeed to some extent are already being addressed - by the ongoing process of evolution and
creative destruction that characterise the modern firm.
 
Indeed, one powerful message ofTennyson's poem is the fundamentality of material well-being as afoundation for any utopia. Although concepts of 'happiness' are open to differing moralinterpretations (as MacIntyre himself discusses in the introduction to this special issue), there isnonetheless considerable evidence indicating a high correlation between health, wealth, and 
46 Elizabeth Fraser and Nicola Lacey, 1994, "MacIntyre, Feminism and the Concept of Practice" in John
Horton and Susan Mendus (op.cit) p 27l.

47 Alasdair MacIntyre Dependent RationalAnimals (op.cit) p 142
48 Alasdair MacIntyre 'A Partial Response to my Critics' (op.cit) p.284.
49 Alfred Lord Tennyson Enoch Arden, 1865 [1992] New York: Dover Publications, p.17.50 Alasdair MacIntyre Dependant RationalAnimals (op.cit) 145 
74 Philosophy of Management Volume 7 Number 1 2008 
..
 
Utopia Reconsidered: The Modern Firm as Institutional Ideal 
happiness for all demographic groupS51. And this includes the elderly and disabled; the latter being 
groups MacIntyre is particularly concerned about in Dependent Rational Animals. Also, in The 
Moral Consequences ofEconomic Growth 52, Ben Friedman provides evidence to indicate that one 
essential ingredient for communal moral health and happiness is economic growth - a view clearly 
endorsed by Enoch Arden. 
Returning to Dependent Rational Animals, MacIntyre describes utopia in terms of 'rejecting the 
economic goals of advanced capitalism'53. My central argument here is that utopia can better be 
described in terms of enhancing these economic goals: economic goals need not of necessity corrupt 
and destroy 'higher' non-economic goals. To put this in MacIntyrean terms: the material success of 
the modern firm does not render it impotent as an institutional foundation for practices. AI; Keat 
recently pointed out, 'although the acquisition of consumer 'goods' takes place through exchange 
within the market (or economic) domain, the realization of their value typically takes place in non-
market domains'54. For example, if! wish to pursue the internal goods of chess, the market will not 
prevent me from whittling my own chess pieces from a piece of walnut (perhaps within a practice-
based community of whittlers) if I so choose; but what it will do is present me with a dizzying array 
of alternative chess sets; not to mention some very sophisticated non-human opponents. But note 
well the choice to participate in the 'consumer society' is mine; a choice that Annie did not have in 
her 'traditional' role as a fisherman's wife. 
For sure, en route to utopia, the modern-firm-as-institutional-foundation-for-practices still faces 
many challenges: poverty, ignorance, discrimination, exploitation, poor working conditions, 
environmental degradation, crass consumerism, to name but a few. But the theme of this article is 
that these problems can best be addressed by the ongoing evolution of the modern firm, not by its 
destruction. 
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